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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC., a
Utah corporation

Supreme Court

Plaintiff and Appellant

No. 890127
Court of Appeals

vs.

No. 890344-CA
F.W. CHAMP, G.H. CHAMP, and
MARY CHAMP NIELSEN, d/b/a
CHAMP ASSOCIATES

District Court
No. C88-02446

Defendants and Respondents

APPELLANTS' BRIEF
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal filed by Commerce Properties, Inc., plaintiff/
appellant, from a final Judgement Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss
Commerce Properties' claim for a real estate commission due on a lease
renewal. The date of the Judgment, and the Order Denying Plaintiff's
Motion to Amend Findings of Fact sought to be reviewed was dated March
14,1989. This appeal from the district court to the Utah Supreme Court
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was filed April 3,1989 pursuant to section 78-2-2, U.C.A., and Rule 3 of
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
Jurisdiction was conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals via transfer
of the case by the Utah Supreme Court on May 24,1989, pursuant to Rule
4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issues presented on appeal are:
a. The lower court failed to apply Utah law that a real estate broker
earned a commission on a lease renewal by procuring a lessee who is
ready, willing, and able, and who is accepted by the lessor.
b. The lower court failed to construe the findings of fact and the
portions of the record most favorable to Commerce Properties in granting
defendant Champs' motion to dismiss.
c. The lower court failed to award attorney's fees under the listing
agreement for appellant having to initiate legal proceedings to collect the
commission due.
DISPOSITIVE STATUTES AND RULES
"25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and
subscribed. In the following cases every agreement shall be void
unless such agreement, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in
writing subscribed by the party to be charged therewith:
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for compensation"
2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action to collect a real estate brokerage commission due
under a commission agreement on renewal of a lease of a certain
industrial property owned by the Champs. The Champs formerly owned
significant holdings in First Security State Bank and now hold numerous
properties throughout Salt Lake County. They entered into an exclusive
6% Sales Agency Contract on January 20,1981 for Commerce Properties to
act as a real estate broker to locate an up to ten year tenant for one of
their properties--a 2.38 acre industrial property located at 1422 South
Redwood Road. Commerce Properties then located Dick Morrison Tire
Company, Inc. to rent the premises for up to 10 years. On or about August
6,1981, Commerce Properties agreed to lower their real estate
commission to facilitate this lease transaction, and entered into a
Commission Agreement wherein Commerce Properties agreed to only
accept 6% of the gross rentals for the first five years of the lease, and a
lessor 3% of the gross rentals if the lease was extended for another five
years. Commerce Properties then completed the negotiations with Dick
Morrison Tire Company, Inc. to rent the premises for a minimum rent of
$477,120.00 over five years commencing August 6,1981 through December
31,1986, with an option to renew for five years at a minimum rent of
$594,000.00 commencing January 1,1987 through December 31,1991.
The Champs paid the 6% commission of $25,461.00 over the first five
years of the lease. During the term of the original lease, the Champs then
3

elected to directly negotiate with their tenant Dick Morrison Tire
Company, Inc. to cancel the old lease and enter into a new lease for the
same five year extension term and at the same rent specified in the
original lease. The Champs then refused to pay the 3% commission due
Commerce Properties for locating a ten year tenant to occupy the Champs
Redwood Road property.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The following facts establish the efforts made by Commerce
Properties to lease the Champs' industrial premises for 10 years:
Commerce Properties, Inc. is a Utah corporation licensed to do real
estate brokering business in the State of Utah (TR. 43). Champ Associates
is a general partnership consisting of F.W. Champ, G.H. Champ, and Mary
Champ Nielsen, who own approximately 2.38 acres of certain industrial
real property locally known as 1422 South Redwood Road, Salt Lake City,
Utah (TR 43).
On or about January 20,1981, Commerce Properties, Inc. and Champ
Associates entered into a written 6% exclusive listing agreement entitled
Sales Agency Contract with Commerce Properties, Inc. to locate a tenant
for their 1422 South Redwood Road Property (Exhibit P-1). The second
paragraph of the Sales Agency Contract (Exhibit P-1) stated:
During the life of this contract, if you find a party who is
ready, able and willing to buy, lease or exchange said property or
any part thereof, at said price and terms, or any other price or
terms, to which I may agree in writing, or if said property or any
part thereof is sold, leased or exchanged during said term by myself
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or any other party, I agree to pay you a commission of 6% of such
sale, lease, or exchange. Should said property be sold, leased or
exchanged within 7 days after such expiration to any party to whom
the property was offered or shown by me, or you, or any other
party during the term of this listing, I agree to pay you the
commission above stated.

Exhibit P-1 also contained a clause awarding costs of collection and
attorneys fees in the event legal proceedings were required to collect the
brokerage commission due. Paragraph 5 of the Sales Agency agreement
states:
In case of the employment of an attorney to enforce any of the
terms of this agreement, I agree to pay a reasonable attorney's fee
and all costs of collection.

This Sales Agency Agreement was extended on March 11,1981 for another
three months (Exhibit P-2).
Pursuant to the listing agreement, Commerce Properties subsequently
located Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. to occupy and lease the Champs'
property for up to ten years (TR 44), as well as make approximately
$125,000.00 in improvements to the property (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR
55).
Dick Morrison Tire Company then entered into a five year written
lease prepared by Commerce Properties, Inc. to lease the Champ
Associates' property for five years commencing August 6,1981 through
December 31,1986 at a rent formula which would guarantee the payment
to the Champs of a minimum of $477,120.00 over the first five year term
of the lease (Exhibit P-3). The written lease contained an option to renew
for another five years commencing January 1,1987 through December 31,
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1991 at a CPI adjusted rent formulae, which would provide the Champs
approximately $594,000.00 over the second five year term (Exhibit P-3).
Dick Morrison Tire Company moved onto the leasehold premises and
made $125,000.00 in improvements for construction of a new retail
building, conditioned pursuant to paragraph 42(a) of the original lease that
upon termination of the original five year lease term on December 31,
1989, Dick Morrison Tire Company was to be paid for said improvements
the lesser of $10,000.00 or 15% of the improvements it made to the
leasehold premises (Exhibit No. P-3, Testimony W.F. Champ, TR. 85,
Deposition Robert Morrison, page 18, line 11, TR.236).
Reduction of Commission to Facilitate Initial Leasing
To assist in the leasing of the Champs' property, on or about August 6,
1981, Commerce Properties, Inc. and Champ Associates entered into a
Commission Agreement drafted by the Champs' attorney, J. Jay Bullock
(Exhibit No. P-4, Testimony Robert Rehn, TR-33), reducing the commission
owed Commerce Properties' for locating Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc.
from 6% of the entire gross lease rentals to approximately 6% of the
$477,120.00 gross lease rentals to be paid during the first five years of
the lease amounting to $25,461.00, and 3% of the $594,000.00 gross
rentals if the original lease was extended another five years, amounting to
$17,800.00 (Exhibit No. P-4).
Commerce Properties, Inc. also agreed to be paid the $25,461.00 in
installments from September 1,1982 through June 1,1983, rather than a
6

lump sum, for the commission due upon execution of the lease for the first
five year term (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR 44,51).
Dick Morrison Tire Company has continually occupied the premises and
paid rents to the Champs from August 6,1981 to the present (Testimony
W.F. Champ, TR 56,57).
Dick Morrison Tire Company's Conduct
Prior to Termination
Prior to October 31,1986, Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. did not
tell the Champs it was or was not going to renew the lease (Defendants
Answer to Interrogatory No. 11).
Dick Morrison Tire Company in the summer of 1986 did not notify the
phone company that it was moving to another location, or change its
telephone number to a new location (Deposition Robert Morrison, pages 28,
29).
In the summer and Fall of 1986, Dick Morrison Tire Company did not
release any advertisements that it was planning to move its facility to
another location (Deposition Robert Morrison, page 29).
Commerce' Assistance in Extending the Lease
Nine months before the expiration of the original lease term, Dick
Morrison Tire Company, Inc., expanded its operations for its mechanical
shops and on February 28,1986, entered into a three year lease of
additional space next to the Champ leasehold premises for $540/month
(Deposition Robert Morrison, pages 26,27, TR.236). To defer the cost of
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this additional space, and reduce the burden of the original lease rentals,
in the Fall of 1986, Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. retained Commerce
Properties, Inc. to arrange for the U.S. Post Office to sublease a portion of
the leasehold premises with the Champs for three years, with an option to
renew for another three years (Deposition Robert Morrison, page 20,
TR.236 concerning U.S. Postal Service Short Form Lease dated December 2,
1986, Exhibit No. P-6).
On or about December 1,1986, the U.S. Post Office subleased 10% of
the Dick Morrison Tire Company leased premises for three years with an
option to renew for another three years (TR.32, Plaintiffs Exhibit No. P-6).
One of the reasons why Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. extended its
occupancy of the Champs' premises another five years was the rent it
received from subleasing the premises (deposition Robert Morrison, page
21, TR.236).
Q. Was your ability to sublease the premises one of the reasons why you
entered into a renewal of the, or a new lease with respect to the premises in
question?
A. Yes.

Neither Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc., nor the Champs requested
Commerce Properties, Inc. to assist in their direct negotiations for an
extension of the lease, or to renegotiate the terms of a new lease
(Testimony Robert Rehn, TR 33).
Lease Extension Negotiated Before Expiration of Lease
During the Fall of 1986, the Champs were ready and willing for Dick
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Morrison Tire Company to extend the lease (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR 56,
67).
"Q. Let me ask you: Were you willing to extend or were you
not?
A. We were very anxious to have Mr. Morrison stay in the
property; and so we would have been certainly flexible. That was
our intent. We wanted him to go ahead with it to begin with.
(TR. 67)

As part of its negotiating strategy, on October 31,1986, Champ
Associates notified Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. via letter that it
refused to accept an extension of the lease because written notice was
not received before October 1,1986 (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR 64).
Upon receipt of the October 31,1986 termination letter (Exhibit No.
P-7), Robert Morrison telephoned F.W. Champ on approximately November
10,1986 and expressed a desire to remain in the premises and secure a
new lease (Testimony W.F. Champ TR. 65). The lease term and rentals were
then immediately agreed upon (TR. 68, 69).
Q. My question was during that first meeting, did you agree to extend
occupancy of the premises with Mr. Morrison another five years at the same
rent?
A. We really wanted a ten-year lease.
Q. You wanted a ten-year lease; he wanted a five-year lease.
A. He didn't want to go any further than five years.
Q. So you settled~at what time did you agree to the five-year term?
A. Well, it was during the course of our negotiations. We had extensive
negotiations in connection with the new lease.
(TR. 68,69)
Q. Mr. Champ, with respect to P-7, the enclosed lease refers to a
five-year term in that draft.
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And the question I have is: Did you authorize Mr. Bullock to send a
five-year lease at that time? Was that your instructions, or were you telling
him to send a ten-year lease?
A. I am sure that I probably indicated a five-year lease, or I am sure he
wouldn't have done it.
Q. So, sometime before November 12 you and Mr. Morrison
had come to an agreement on a five-year lease; is that fair to say?
A. Well, that was a starting point.
(TR. 71,72)

On November 11,1986, two months prior to the expiration of the
original lease, F.W. Champ met with J. Jay Bullock regarding the terms of a
new lease (Testimony W.F. Champ TR 65). One day later on November 12,
1986, Champ Associates submitted a fifteen page single spaced lease to
Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. for it to occupy the same premises, for
the same five year lease term and rentals as that specified in the lease
option of the original lease, (Testimony W.F. Champ TR. 65, Plaintiffs
Exhibit No. P-5). Various drafts were then exchanged concerning other
rental terms before the actual lease drafted by J. Jay Bullock was actually
signed on January 6,1987 (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR. 76).
Major Lease Terms Identical
The major terms of the new lease were identical to those arranged by
Commerce Properties in the original lease extension. It has: 1) the same
five year term, and 2) incorporated the same rental formula in the original
lease option to pay the Champs at least $589,600.00 over the five year
term (Testimony W.F. Champ TR 73, deposition Robert Morrison, page 31).
Q. So, after November 12, it was a five-year lease that was going to be
the term agreed upon.
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A. This is what we were talking about at that time.
Q. And the rental formula in both leases was going to be the same?
A. When you say the rent formula the same, there is a difference in the
rent abatement in connection with the first month.
Q. And that you discussed earlier, is that correct, that half-month
adjustment we were talking about?
A. Yes.
Q. So as far as the cost of living escalators and the base
month rent, those were basically the same as the first lease
negotiated by Commerce Properties, is that correct?
A. I believe that's the case.
(TR.73)

Parties Recognized Commissions Due
Paragraph 16 of the new lease contained a right of first refusal if
Dick Morrison Tire Company elected to purchase the property, wherein the
Champs agreed to split the real estate commission due Commerce
Properties, Inc. with Dick Morrison Tire Company, Inc. (Exhibit No. P-5).
Upon Alleged Termination
The Champs treatment of Dick Morrison Tire Company after the
signing of the new lease documents was virtually identical to that
required if the original lease had been extended. The Champs did not pay
Morrison Tire either sum for the improvements made to the property
(TR.85) as required if the original lease had been terminated after the
initial five year lease term (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR. 75).
Q. The question I am asking you is: At the--what you have termed the
"expiration of the first lease," did you pay any amounts under paragraph 43A to
Mr. Morrison for the improvements?
A. No.
Q. You did not pay the 15% or the $10,000 of any-under the
paragraph?
A. That's correct.
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At the time Dick Morrison Tire Company entered into the original
lease, it posted an $8,250.00 security deposit, which was to be returned
on December 31,1986 on termination of the original five year lease
(Testimony W.F. Champ, TR-86). The Champs did not return the security
deposit to Dick Morrison Tire Company on December 31,1986 (Testimony
W.F. Champ (TR-86).
The Champs did not pay personal property taxes on the fixtures and
improvements installed on the premises by Robert Morrison Tire Company,
Inc. after termination of the original lease (Testimony W.F. Champ TR 75).
Champs Continual Refusal to Pay Commission
Even though there has been a de facto extension of the old lease, the
Champs to date have failed and continue to refuse to pay the remaining
$17,800.00 commission Commerce Properties claims is due for locating a
ready, willing, and able lessee to occupy the leasehold premises for ten
years (Testimony W.F. Champ, TR 44,45).
Commerce Properties expended in excess of $5,000.00 in attorneys
fees through the trial in its efforts to collect the commission it claims is
due (Affidavit Marcus G. Theodore, TR. 134).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
PLAINTIFF EARNED ITS COMMISSION BY FINDING A TEN YEAR
TENANT AND SHOULD BE PAID
12

The general rule of law in Utah is that a broker has earned a
commission on procuring a purchaser who is ready, willing, and able, and
who is accepted by the vendor. The broker is not the insurer of subsequent
performance of the contract and is not deprived of the right to a
commission by failure or refusal of the buyer to perform; see Bushnell
Real Estate. Inc. vs.Nielson. 672 P.2d 746 (Utah 1983). The right of a
broker who has procured a tenant for a lessor to recover a commission on a
renewal, extension, or renegotiations of the lease, where the negotiations
were made directly between the lessor and lessee, depends upon the
presence of express contractual provisions for such commission; see Seav
vs. Bennett & Kahnweiler Associates, etal.. 73 III. App. 3d 945, 392 N.E.2d
609 (I979). The court in this case stated:
"...to sustain an action for a broker's commission on a lease
renewal, the broker must prove that a special agreement
existed in addition to the initial agreement for securing a
lessee; that the special agreement between the lessor and the
broker was reduced to writing; that the lease renewal was
negotiated under the same terms as the initial lease; or that
the lease renewal was the result of services performed by the
broker."
This same rule was followed in Rosenveld Realty Company vs. Cadence
Industries Corporation. 75 Misc.2d 634, 348 N.Y.S.2d 523 (1973) where the
court awarded the real estate commission, and summarized the three
elements required to prevail as follows:
"The court in these cases set forth three requirements
13

before a broker would be entitled to commissions on renewals
of a lease. These are: 1) A special agreement between the
broker and the lessor. Mullen & Woods. Inc. v. 615 W. 57th
Street. Inc.. 146 Misc. 599, 262 N.Y.S. 467; 2) Compliance with
(at that time) former Section 31 of the Personal Property Law
(now Section 5-701) of the General Obligations Law, known as
the Statute of Frauds) Allwin Realty Co. vs. Barth. 161 App.Div.
568, 146 N.Y.S. 960; and 3) That the renewal was for the same
term and rent. Tracv vs. Albany Exchange Co.. 7 N.Y. 472. The
courts also stated that in the event of failure to prove "3" there
must be proof that the renewal was the result of services
performed by the broker."
Applying the above standards to the case at hand:
1) There was a brokerage agreement between Commerce Properties
and the Champs regarding a commission due on extension of the Dick
Morrison Tire lease-see Paragraph 3 of the Commission Agreement
(Exhibit P-3) between Commerce Properties, Inc. and the Champs which
required the Champs to pay a $17,820.00 commission upon the extension of
the lease for a five year term with the same lessee of the same property:
"3. In the event the term of the Lease shall be extended
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 48 of the Lease, the
commission payable by the Principal to the Agent upon the
renewal of the Lease shall be the sum of $17,820.00, computed
as follows:

$594,000.00
x .03
$

17,820.00"

2) The Commission Agreement (Exhibit P-4) was in writing in
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accordance with the statute of frauds, Section 25-5-4(5), U.C.A.,
1953, as amended;
3) The renewal was for an identical term according to Robert
Morrison and the lease documents:
i.
"Q. The new lease is for the same five year term as the
renewal, is that correct?
A. Yes." (Deposition Robert Morrison, page 31, TR.36)
ii. The lease documents are co-terminus--The five year term
contained in paragraph 2 of the Bullock Lease (Exhibit P-6) began on the 1st
day of January, 1987 and ended December 31,1991:
"2. TERM. The term of this Lease shall continue for a
term of five (5) years, beginning on the 1 st day of January,
1987, and ending on the 31 st day of December 1991."
This term is identical to the term contained in Paragraph 48 of the term of
the original Lease Extension (Exhibit P-3) Paragraph 48 of the original
Lease states:
"48. OPTION TO RENEW. Tenant is hereby
granted an option to renew this lease for one
additional five-year term, commencing January 1,
1987, on the same terms and conditions as
contained in the original lease, ..."
iii) The rental formulas in both leases are the same, according to the
above testimony of Robert Morrison and F.W. Champ, and can be seen from a
comparison of the language in the lease documents:
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The CPI rental formula in paragraph 48 of the original Lease states:
"48. OPTION TO RENEW. Tenant is hereby granted an
option to renew this lease for one additional five-year term,
commencing January 1, 1987, on the same terms and conditions
percentage of increase shall be calculated for one-year time as
contained in the original lease, with the exception of the rental
amount, which shall be increased by one cent per square foot per
month per year, or 50% of the Consumer Price Index, whichever
is greater. The formula for determining the Consumer Price
Index increase will be based on the percentage increase of the
Consumer Price Index as published by the U.S. Department of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 911 Walnut Street, Kansas
City, Missouri, USC Average Revised Urban Wage Earners and
Clerical Workers. The rental shall be calculated as follows:
Consumer Price Index (hereinafter referred to as CPI Index)
shall be obtained for December of the preceding year and Index
shall be obtained for December of the then current year. The
percentage increase shall be calculated for one-year time
periods. The percentage increase shall be reduced to 50% and
shall be multiplied by the then current amount of monthly rental,
then added to that base rental. The new figure then will be the
rental for the next twelve-month period. (Example:
1986
rental, $8,250 per month - CPI increase 10%. 10% x $8,250
= $825 x 50% = $412.50 + 8,250 = $8,662.50 = the new
monthly rental.) However, in the event that the rent (increase
under the CPI Index formula) is less than one cent per square foot
per month, the new rent for that year will be increased by one
cent per square foot per month. The rental for each successive
year (6-10) shall be computed in this fashion and delivered to
tenant by landlord at least seven (7) days prior to when the
rental increase is to take effect. The landlord will provide tenant
with all supporting documents and calculations to confirm the
new rental amount. The option to renew this lease shall be
exercised by written notice delivered by the tenant to the landlord
on or before October 1, 1986.

The CPI rental formula contained in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the Bullock
Lease state:
3. RENT. The Lessee agrees to pay as rent to the Lessor,
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at the address specified in this Lease or at such other location as
Lessor may from time to time designate in writing, the total sum
of Five Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand Six Hundred and NO/100
DOLLARS ($589,600.00), without deduction or offset, adjusted
at the end of each calendar year beginning January 1, 1988, for
the increase in the Consumer Price Index as set forth in
Paragraph 4, payable as follows:
(a) The rent shall be paid on January 1, 1987, for the
month of January, 1987, shall be Four Thousand Four Hundred
AND NO/100 DOLLARS ($4,400.00).
(b) The rent to be paid in February 1, 1987, and each
month thereafter, shall be equal to the greater, including yearly
adjustments, of the new rent computed in paragraph 4 using
$8,800.00 as the rent from the previous adjustment date.
In the event, Lessee shall fail to pay any rent payable
under this Lease on the due date or within seven (7) days
thereafter, a late charge of one percent (1%) per month of the
delinquent rent shall be added to said rent and paid to the Lessor
together therewith.
4. RENT ADJUSTMENT EACH YEAR. Rent shall be
adjusted for each year ending December 31st to reflect changed in
the purchasing power of the dollar. As of the first day of the year
following the effective date of this Lease or the date of the last
adjustment, the rent payable shall be adjusted to reflect one-half
(1/2) of the increase in the Consumer Price Index (All Items,
U.S.) published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the United
States Department of Labor from the previous adjustment date to
the date of the current adjustment. The adjustment shall be
computed as follows:
R = Rent from previous adjustment date.
C1 = Consumer Price Index at previous adjustment date
C2 = Consumer Price Index at current adjustment date
R + R 1/2 (C2 - C1)/C1 = New Rent
In the event the increase in rent due to increases in the
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CPI shall be less than one (1) cent per square foot per month, the
new rent for that year will be increased by one (1) cent per
square foot per month from the rent for the previous year. The
Lessor shall notify the Lessee of the new rental amount at least
seven (7) days prior to January 1 of each year.

iv. The gross rental receipts projected under both leases are also
approximately the same--The $589,600.00 gross rentals referred to in
paragraph 3 of the Bullock lease are virtually identical to the projected
$594,000.00 gross rentals due under the lease extension:
Compare paragraph 3 of the Bullock lease Exhibit P-6 which
states:
"3. RENT. The Lessee agrees to pay as rent to the Lessor,
at the address specified in this Lease or at such other location as
Lessor may from time to time designate in writing, the total sum
of Five Hundred Eighty-Nine Thousand Six Hundred and No/100
Dollars ($589,600.00)..."
VS.

The projected $594,000 projected gross rents calculated in paragraph
3 of the Broker's Commission Agreement (Exhibit P-4):
3. In the event the term of the Lease shall be extended
pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 48 of the Lease, the
commission payable by the Principal to the Agent upon the
renewal of the Lease shall be the sum of $17,820.00, computed
as follows:

$594,000.00
x .03
$
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17,820.00

In addition, under the Tracy vs. Albany Exchange Co.. 7 N.Y. 472
criteria, where the renewal was largely the result of services performed
by Commerce Properties' arrangement for the U.S. Post Office to sublease a
portion of the Champs' premises, the Champs' received the benefits of
Commerce Properties' real estate brokering efforts and should pay for the
same.
"Q. Was your ability to sublease the premises one of the
reasons why you entered into a renewal of the, or a new lease
with respect to the premises in question?
A. Yes" (Deposition Robert Morrison, page 21, TR. 236)
The terms payment was to be made under the Commission Agreement
(Exhibit P-3) must be construed with the performance terms required
under the original listing agreement (Exhibit P-3). The listing agreement
incorporated the Bushnell Real Estate. Inc. vs. Nielson standards, supra,
and state that Commerce Properties was to be paid upon the presentation
of a lessor who was willing and able to lease the Champs' property for up
to 10 years. These documents must be construed together under the
Greaerson vs. Jensen. 617 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980) standard to determine the
intent of the parties. If there is any ambiguity between the documents,
they should be construed against the Champs, who had their attorney J. Jay
Bullock prepare the subsequent agreement, see Seal vs. Tavco. Inc.. 16
U.2d 323, 400 P.2d 503 (1965). However, inasmuch as the second
document was executed pursuant to and expressly referred to the original
listing agreement, the documents should be construed together to reflect
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the intent of the parties. Commerce Properties would not have expended
efforts in subleasing a portion of the property to the U.S. Post Office, had
it known that it would not have been paid for arranging for the underlying
ten year tenant.
Damages should therefore be awarded against the Champs for
improperly manipulating the lease documents with Dick Morrison Tire
Company in a manner which enabled them to unjustly reap the benefits
negotiated by Commerce Properties, Inc.; see Hawkins vs. Perrv. 123 U. 16,
253 P.2d 372 (1953), wherein the Utah Supreme Court imposed a
constructive trust to prevent one from unjustly profiting through fraud or
the violation of a duty imposed under a fiduciary or confidential
relationship. The Champs had a duty to protect the commission interests
of Commerce Properties, when they elected to unilaterally negotiate
directly with Dick Morrison Tire Company for the same rent concessions
and terms negotiated by Commerce Properties. Their conduct was
therefore inequitable, and tortuously interfered with the business
interests of appellants. The lower court's decision should therefore be
reversed on appeal.
POINT TWO
IN THE GRANTING OF RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSTRUE THE FACTS
MOST FAVORABLY TO APPELLANT
The lower court failed to construe the findings of fact and the
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portions of the record most favorably to plaintiff in granting the Champs'
motion to dismiss, contrary to the requirements of Martin vs. Stevens. 121
U. 484, 243 P.2d 747(1952); Davis vs Pavne & Dav. Inc.. 10 U.2d 53, 348
P.2d 337(1960); and Lawrence vs. Bamberger R.R.: 3 U.2d 247, 282 P.2d
335(1955). Instead, the court entered findings most favorable to the
Champs. These findings were therefore entered contrary to law, and the
decision of the lower court should be reversed on appeal.
POINT THREE
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO AWARD ATTORNEYS FEES
As a result of the lower court's improper dismissal of plaintiffs
cause of action, it also failed to award appellant its attorney's fees
provided for in its listing agreement (Exhibit P-1) in having to bring this
action to collect its real estate commission. The lower court therefore
erred in failing to award appellant its costs and attorney's fees.
SUMMARY
The Champs entered into a written commission agreement to pay
Commerce Properties, Inc. a commission if the five year lease with Dick
Morrison Tire Company was extended for five years at the same rent rates
contained therein. Dick Morrison Tire Company subsequently entered into a
five year lease extension under a separate lease document on substantially
the same rentals, and for an identical lease term. The Champs should
therefore pay the $17,800.00 real estate commission for the benefits
received from Commerce Properties, Inc., which produced a ready, willing,
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and able ten year lessee, who was accepted by the Champs.
CONCLUSION
Under the above facts, the Champs should not be allowed to
unilaterally manipulate the lease extension documents with their tenant
and receive the benefit of the brokerage services provided by Commerce
Properties in locating a ten year tenant at the rentals specified. The
Champs have received the benefits of a $594,000.00 lease extension from
a tenant located by Commerce Properties, Inc. They should therefore be
required to pay the $17,800.00 3% commission due, plus interest, costs,
and attorney's fees under the Bushnell Real Estate. Inc. vs. Nielson
standard, above.
Dated this 2J*

day of July, I989.

Marcus G. Theodore
Attorney for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of appellant's,
Commerce Properties, Inc.'s, Brief to the following this ^ / ^ d a v of
July, 1988:
Irene Warr, Esq.
Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq.
Suite 280, 311 South State
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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APPENDIX

JUDGMENT

y*T

PAUL N. COTRO-MANES, #736
IRENE WARR, #3393
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 280, 311 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-1300

MAR 1 't «89

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

JUDGMENT

vs.
Civil No. C 8802446
F. W. CHAMP, G. H. CHAMP and
MARY CHAMP NIELSEN d/b/a
CHAMP ASSOCIATES,

Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.
The above entitled matter came on for trial before
the Honorable Raymond S. Uno, District Judge, sitting without a
jury, on the 17th day of February, 1989, the plaintiff
appearing through one of its corporate employees and being
represented by its attorney, Marcus G. Theodore, Esq., and the
defendants appearing by and through one of its general
partners, F. W. (Winton) Champ, and being represented by their
attorneys, Paul N. Cotro-Manes, Esq., and

Irene Warr, Esq.,

and the Court having taken testimony and received evidence and
the plaintiff having rested its case and the defendants having
made a motion to dismiss for failure of the plaintiffs to prove
a claim upon which relief could be granted based upon the
record and evidence adduced by it, and the parties having
submitted written memoranda to the Court,and the Court being

fully advised in the premises, and the Court having made its
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and based thereon it
is:
ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
That Plaintiff's complaint be and the same is hereby
dismissed with prejudice and that defendants are granted
judgment of no cause of action and are entitled to their costs.
DONE IN OPEN COURT this / 7 * day of February, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

District Judge

Plaintiff's Last Known Address:
50 West Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on t h e ^ t h day of February,
1989, the undersigned caused a copy of the foregoing Judgment
to be served upon the plaintiff by depositing a copy of the
same into the United States Mail, postage prepaid and
addressed to:
Marcus G. Theodore, Esq.
Attorney at Law
275 East South Temple, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
This Judgment is forwarded to the above party pursuant
to Rule 4.504 Rules of Judicial Administration and any
o

objection as to said Judgment should be made within five
/

••-?

(5) days of date of service,

/
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PAUL N. COTRO-MANES, #736
IRENE WARR, #3393
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Suite 280, 311 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 531-1300

MAR 2 3 1989
Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC.,
a Utah corporation,
Plaintiff,

ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS
OF FACT

vs.
Civil No. C 8802446
F. W. CHAMP, G. H. CHAMP and
MARY CHAMP NIELSEN d/b/a
CHAMP ASSOCIATES,

Judge Raymond S. Uno

Defendants.
Plaintiff's motion to amend findings of fact came
on for hearing on the 14th day of March, 1989, at the hour
of 9:45 o'clock, a.m., the plaintiff appearing by and through
its attorney Marcus G. Theodore, Esq. and the defendants
appearing by and through one of their attorneys, Paul N.
Cotro-Manes, Esq., and the Court having ordered that the
plaintiff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and the Objections to Defendants' Proposed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law filed on the 2nd day of March be deemed a
motion to amend defendants Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, which order was based upon the stipulation of the parties,
and the matter having been argued to the Court and submitted to

it for decision, and the Court having restated its findings and
conclusions which were in conformity with the defendants1
proposed findings and conclusions, and the Court being fully
advised in the pemises, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED:
That the plaintiff's motion to amend findings of fact
and conclusions of law is denied,
DONE IN OPEN COURT this<-^[_day of March, 1989.

BY THE COURT:

fiX^fy^-rJ^
District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 14th day of March',
1989, the undersigned caused a copy of the foregoing Order
to be served upon the plaintiff by depositing a copy of the
same into the United States Mail, postage prepaid and
addressed to:
Marcus G. Theodore, Esq.
Attorney at Law
275 East South Temple, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
This Order is forwarded to the above party pursuant
to Ruls 4.504 Rules of Judicial Administration and any
objection as to said Order should be made within five
(5) days of date of service.

APPEAL
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'^T

^

Marcus G. Theodore #3224
Attorney for Commerce Properties, Inc.
275 East South Temple, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 80I-359-8622
^ ^

r
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

«cP

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

\ »

COMMERCE PROPERTIES, INC.
Plaintiff
vs.
NOTICE OF APPEAL
F.W. CHAMP, G.H. CHAMP, and
MARY CHAMP NIELSEN d/b/a
CHAMP ASSOCIATES

Civil No. C-88-02446
The Honorable Raymond S. Uno

Defendants
Pursuant to 4(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, notice is hereby given that
plaintiff, Commerce Properties, Inc., hereby appeals to the Utah Supreme Court from the
Judgment entered in this action on March 14,1989, and the Order Denying Plaintiffs' Motion to
Amend Findings of Fact entered March 14,1989.
Dated this 3rd day of April, I989.

-
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^

-

Marcus G. Theodore, Attorney for Appellant
275 East South Temple, Suite 303
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(80I) 359-8622

STATUTE

25-5-4

FRAUD

plicable where the alleged acts of part performance were not referable to the alleged oral
contract to sell land. McDonald v. Barton Bros.
Inv. Corp., 631 P.2d 851 (Utah 1981).
The doctrine of partial performance was not
applicable where all of the acts alleged were
not exclusively referable to the alleged oral
modification of a construction and lease agreement. Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740
P.2d 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
—Evidence.
Purchaser of land under an oral contract
seeking to avoid the statute of frauds under the
doctrine of part performance, based upon his
possession of the land and improvements
thereon, must establish that possession was actual, open, exclusive and with the seller's consent; improvements made were substantial,
valuable and beneficial; a valuable consideration was given in exchange for the conveyance; and all of the foregoing was exclusively
referable to the contract. Coleman v. Dillman,
624 P.2d 713 (Utah 1981).
To meet the part performance exception to
the statute of frauds, the terms of the oral contract must be established by clear and definite
evidence. Bradshaw v. McBnde, 649 P2d 74
(Utah 1982).
Promissory estoppel.
The elements of promissory estoppel necessary to preclude the operation of this section
were not present in a case where a lessee and a
man claiming to be the lessor entered into an
oral agreement for the lease of property and
the lease was to be reduced to writing by the
lessor but was never written because the lessor
learned of a defect in the chain of title. The
lessee moved on the property and then brought
action against the claimed lessor. The lessee
did not expend any moneys upon the leased
premises, but was damaged because of the loss
of a good bargain. Easton v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d
386, 295 P.2d 332 (1956).

agreement to sell described land to plaintiff at
specified price, which was void under this section, and plaintiff thereafter entered into contract to sell same land to third person at profit,
but, when defendant learned of latter contract,
he refused to sell to plaintiff and sold land to
third person for same amount that latter had
agreed to pay plaintiff, plaintiff was not entitled to recover on theory of unjust enrichment
for value of his services in procuring purchaser, even in absence of § 25-5-4(5). Baugh
v. Darley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P2d 335 (1947).
Sale defined.
As applied to land, the word "sale" implies
the creation of an estate in excess of a leasehold, by the act of the owner. Lewis v. Dahl,
108 Utah 486, 161 P.2d 362, 160 A.L.R. 1040
(1945).
Settling of accounts.
Defense that agreement by wife to convey
ranch to former husband and herself jointly
was not in writing and thereby void was not
invocable in equity proceedings of settling accounts between the parties where ranch had
been sold and court was concerned only with
distribution of proceeds. Corbet v. Corbet, 24
Utah 2d 378, 472 P.2d 430 (1970).
Subscription.
A document to be enforceable under the statute of frauds must be subscribed by the party
granting the conveyance. Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421 (Utah 1986).
Surrender, release or discharge.
Surrender of interest under contract for purchase of land could be properly effected without
a deed or conveyance in writing m compliance
with this statute. Budge v. Barron, 51 Utah
234, 169 P. 745 (1917).
Termination or rescission of contract.
An agreement to terminate or rescind a contract must be in writing, if the contract that is
extinguished falls within the statute of frauds.
SCM Land Co. v. Watkins & Faber, 732 P.2d
105 (Utah 1986).

Recovery upon quantum meruit or theory
of unjust enrichment.
Where defendant owner entered into oral

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur. 2d Statute of
Frauds § 59 et seq.

Key Numbers. — Frauds, Statute of *» 71
et seq.

25-5-4. Certain agreements void unless written and subscribed.
In the following cases every agreement shall be void unless such agreement,
or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the party to
be charged therewith:
12

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

25-5-4

(1) Every agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within one
year from the making thereof.
(2) Every promise to answer for the debt, default or miscarriage of
another.
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration
of marriage, except mutual promises to marry.
(4) Every special promise made by an executor or administrator to
answer in damages for the liabilities, or to pay the debts, of the testator or
intestate out of his own estate.
(5) Every agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to
purchase or sell real estate for compensation.
History: R-S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 2467; L.
1909, ch. 72, § 1; C.L. 1917, § 5817; R.S. 1933
& C. 1943, 33-5-4.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Accord and satisfaction.
Affirmative defense.
Alteration or modification of original contract.
Assignments.
Brokerage contracts.
—Action by broker.
—Finder's agreement.
—Fully executed contracts.
—Procuring lessee.
—Procuring option.
—Subscription.
City council minutes.
Contract not to be performed within a year.
—Automobile rental.
Contract to make will.
Evidence.
—Proving nature of agreement.
Part performance.
Promise to recover for another's debt or default.
—Promisor's own purposes served.
Recovery upon quantum meruit.
Revocation or release of agreement to answer
for debt of another.
Stipulation.
Unilateral contracts.
Accord and satisfaction.
Although it is well settled in Utah that if an
original agreement is within the statute of
frauds, a subsequent modifying agreement
must also satisfy the statute of frauds, an accord and satisfaction is something entirely different and need not be in writing, even if the
original contract was within the statute of
frauds. Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Mantas, 699
P.2d 730 (Utah 1985).
Affirmative defense.
When an action is on a contract, admitted by

defendant, he must interpose a special plea of
this statute if statute is to be available as a
defense. Abba v. Smyth, 21 Utah 109,59 P. 756
(1899).
Statute of frauds must be pleaded by party
relying upon it as a defense. M & S Constr. &
Eng*g Co. v. Clearfield State Bank, 19 Utah 2d
86, 426 P.2d 227 (1967).
Defendant, who answered by a general denial and simultaneous motion to dismiss plaintiffs claim as being barred under Subsection
(2) of this section, proceeded improperly, since
under Rule 12(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, statute of frauds is not a ground for motion to dismiss but rather an affirmative defense under Rule 8(c). W.W. & W.B. Gardner,
Inc. v. Pappas, 24 Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252
(1970).
Alteration or modification of original contract.
If original contract, to be binding and enforceable, and to satisfy the statute of frauds, is
required to be in writing and subscribed by
parties sought to be charged, then a subsequent agreement altering or modifying any of
its material parts or terms is also required to
be in writing and so subscribed, no part performance or anything done by such party in reliance on the subsequent agreement being alleged or proved, especially if interest in land is
involved. Combined Metals, Inc. v. Bastian, 71
Utah 535, 267 P. 1020 (1928).
Parties may modify orally an agreement in
writing where the original contract is not required by the statute of frauds to be in writing,
at least where there is consideration for such
modification. But a contract required by the
statute of frauds to be in writing cannot be
modified by a subsequent oral agreement, although this rule is subject to many exceptions,
the first great division coming between execu-
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